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THE LINACRE QUARTERLY
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Would you be so kind as to inform me whether a Catholic
physician can ethically form a partnership with a non
Catholic who practices as follows contrary to the precepts
of the Church: 1) advocates .and performs direct steriliza
tions: 2) performs "therapeutic"· abortions: 3) dispenses
contraceptive devices. I would appreciate a reference to
specifi.c pronouncements of the hierarchy in regard to the
ethics of such an association.
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Father John J. Lynch, S.J., Professor of Moral Theology at Westc
College, Weston, Mass. and consultant for THE LINACRE QUAF
TERLY presents the moral aspects of this proposal for the benefit c
our readers.

T

HE question as proposed is not one which can be answered with
out qualification, presenting as it does one of those situations c
which even a moralist must say, "Circumstances alter cases." An,
since not all the pertinent circumstances can be inferred with certaint,
f��m the data available, no solution could claim to be more than suppo·
s1t1onal until additional facts have been ascertained.
Before stating, however, the suppositions on which this answer i
b�sed, it would be well to forestall any possible misunderstanding whicl
_
might be occasioned by the details of the problem itself. There are tw,
such items, closely related to each other, which could distract one fro.
the essential point of the solution. First: the fact that the other doc to,
in �h� partnership is a non-Catholic does not bear essentially o.n th<
dec1s1on of the case. The reason for this assertion lies in item numbe;
two, viz., that the specific procedures cited in the problem as immora:
are not merely forbidden by the positive law of the Catholic Church
b�t are immutable tenets of the natural law binding every human indi
v1�ual regardless of religious creed. As Fr. Gerald Kelly, S.J., has
_
pomted out m previous comments on the Catholic Hospital Code, " . ..
a ?o�ble standard cannot be admitted when there is question of the
prmc1ples of natural law and of their application to medical cases. For
since this law is the same for all human nature, it holds equally for
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non-Catholic patients and Catholic patients, for Catholic doctors and
non-Catholic doctors. "1 Hence, whatever the conclusion reached· regard
ing a medical partnership of this kind, difference of faith is a substan
tially irrelevant factor.
Proceeding then on that understanding, these are the suppositions or
assumptions of which I previously made mention. I presume, first of all,
that medical "partnership" is intended to mean something substantially
more than merely sharing an office. In other words. I understand that
this is a partnership in the commonly accepted and legal sense of the
word ( to whatever extent legal partnership may be compatible with the
established ethics of the medical profession )-the sort of thing which
might be exemplified in a private clinic operated jointly by two or more
doctors who "have joined together in the practice of medicine, and so
hold themselves out to the public and patients, where all income and
expenses are a joint account or joint venture." 2 I take for granted, too,
that the Catholic physician would readily recognize the immorality on
his part of any explicit approval, even only interior, of the illicit phase
of his partner's practice, and would a fortiori realize that he could pro
vide no physical assistance in any such medical or surgical procedures.
The problem then is reduced to that of being formally associated in
partnership with a physician, some of whose common practices are
admittedly immoral. In those immoral procedures the Catholic doctor
does not participate physically, nor does he grant them explicit approval.
With regard to specific pronouncements of the hierarchy on that
precise situation, there is none to my knowledge; unless possibly some
directive on the point be included in a local hospital code with which I
am not familiar. It would be simply impossible for Church authorities to
legislate expressly for every conceivable moral situation; and hence it
must frequently happen that the Church leave to theologians the task of
providing solutions for concrete cases as they occur by applying stand
ard moral rules. This, I would say, is one of those instances where,
instead of enjoying the convenience of an explicit directive to solve a
problem, we are left to work it out for ourselves in the light of general
moral principles.
What answer, then, would a moralist give to this problem? On the
basis of the above assumptions, my own opinion - with which I feel
confident other moralists would agree substantially-is that there appear
to be at least two serious reasons for saying that such a partnership is
not morally permissible, while no reason occurs as sufficient to justify
the association. (It should be apparent that this is not an apodictical
and universal solution, but one ·which is based only on available infor-

7

THE LINACRE QUARTERLY

THE LINACRE QUARTERLY

mation, with the realization that other facts as yet undisclosed mig 1t
possibly persuade me to qualify my decision in an individual case.)

Is there verified in the case at hand this concept of cooperation in
another's sin; and if so, is it a permissible or illicit form of cooperation?
According to our original assumption, the Catholic doctor does not
cooperate with his partner by participating physically in the actual
procedures mentioned, nor does he in any way explicitly approve .them.
Theologians therefore would admit that his cooperation, if any, is not
immediate in that sense, but at most mediate, i.e. contributing to the
partner's sin through the medium of other actions perhaps good or indif
ferent in themselves. They would then attempt to determine whether
the fact of partnership facilitates the unethical practices of the one, and
whether even that degree of mediate cooperation on the other's part is
sincerely unintended to be such and only grudgingly permitted because
of some other necessary good to be achieved through the medical
partnership. They would, in short, be vitally concerned about the
Catholic doctor's real attitude towards the moral deviations of his asso
ciate, whether it be one of genuine or only simulated disapproval. For
as was said before, to approve of sin, either one's own or another's, is
. in itself sinful.

6

THE MALICE OF COOPERATING IN ANOTHER'S SIN
The first reason is derived from the natural law prohibition again t
cooperating with the sinful acts of others · or, to put it another wa
against helping others to commit sin. It stands to reason that if or �
person willingly assists another in the actual performance o f an intrins
cally evil act, his cooperation is sinful on two scores: first because c:
his willful approval of the evil intrinsic to the sinful act itself, an I
secondly because of his violation of fraternal charity in being a willin J
instrument of another's sin. Love of neighbor obliges u s to refraiI .
insofar as is reasonably possible, from allowing evil to befall other..
even when they themselves are intent upon it. And what greater ev \
than that of sin can be alleged? Thus, for instance, the doctor, wh· ·
would agree actually to assist in an illicit operation, would stand i1
conscience accused of this two-fold malice: of having violated, first, th.
fifth commandment and, secondly, his grave duty of fraternal charity
However, we are supposing that this manner of cooperation is no
verified in the present case.
But it frequently happens that one's cooperation with another's si1
consists, not in a participation in the very act which is sinful, but rathe.
in some more remote action which, though innocent perhaps in itself
does make it possible or less difficult for the other to commit his sin. I
that sinful possibility is foreseen as a likely result of my innocent action
I am still obliged by charity to refrain, as far as is reasonably possible
from allowing another to perpetrate that moral evil. In other words
there must be good and substantial reason for my performing even ar
act innocent in itself. if that act is recognized as one which will helr:
another to sin. The gravity of the reason required to justify my acting
and thus permitting him to perform the evil on which he is intent, wil1
vary according to the gravity of the sin foreseen and according to the
relative importance of my act to his opportunity for sinning. And unde1
no circumstances may one intend that his act be of assistance to
· another's sin. Here again we have application of the familiar principle
of double effect to justify our doing something. good or indifferent in
itself, which will have two immediate results, one good and the other
evil. And among the conditions requisite for the legitimate use of that
principle are absence of all evil intention on the part of the agent, and
moral proportion between good and bad effect.

. And under such scrutiny the conduct of the "innocent" partner
might easily provide cause for moral criticism on such grounds, for
example, as the following:
a) Unquestionably any two doctors, who enter into a partnership, do
so for the mutual advantages entailed, and each thereby expresses
himself as willing that the other benefit from their association. Now
one advantage to be expected for the non-Catholic in this case is
that his confrere's known religion should attract a certain number of
patients who prefer to entrust their medical treatment to a Catholic
conscience, and who in good faith would presume as guarantee suff i
cient against immoral advice or procedures that lone fact qf a
Catholic's associating himself with the partnership. Let us suppose
that in continued good faith, or after suasion by the non-Catholic
doctor, some of these patients are submitted to illicit treatment.
. Those evils are in some sense the responsibility of the Catholic
· partner, whose religion and presumed integrity provided the initial
attraction for those patients and made possible those specific sins on
the part of his associate.
b) How would the Catholic react to direct requests from any of his own
patients for contraceptive advice or illicit surgery? Morally he is
obliged to refuse all such requests, nor can he refer them, even by
implication, to his less scrupulous associate. If he should, he would
again be helping others to sin, and could scarcely deny that he does
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not intend their sinful act. Presumably the non-Catholic would f :
unwilling that these patients be turned away, and normally woul :l
demand that they at le ast be refe r red to h im. How would the
Catholic solve that situation to the satisfaction of his partner and
without compromising moral principl es?
c) If medical partne rship is correctly interpreted as a situation wher
"all income and expenses are a j oint account and joint venture," th
fact of coope ration in and approval of illicit practices is again cliff:
cult to evade. A portion of those expenses and a portion of the
income are presumably due to immoral medical proced ures. T o he!
meet th ose expenses, or to share in th ose proceeds, surely betrays
spirit of coope ratio n and approval wh ich cannot be condoned.
T hose are but some of the obj ections w hich might be leveled agaim
a partnership of this kind. It cannot of course be said with certainty th 2.
all, or even any, of the above instances of coope ration are necessaril·
verified in every such medical partnership. But it is difficult f or me t
see how the Catholic doctor in such a situation can entirely avoid coop
erating in o ne such se rious way or another with the illicit practices c
his associate. H ence, as I stated originally, I see here a grave reaso:
militating against this type of partnership, while no r eason occurs to m
as sufficient to justify it. Furthermore ( and this is possibly of evei
greater importance), even if the Catholic doctor were, b oth in word an,
in fact, totally unsympathetic and uncooperative with the immora
phases of his partner's practice, that is not the interpretation whicl
people in general commonly make of such an association. And th a
brings us to the second consideration, that of scandal.
THE MALICE OF SCANDAL
;,candal is a m uch underestimated moral concept among th ose whc
do not appreciate its theo logical implications. Beca use of the compara
tively mild significance which our common usage has attached to tht
words, we are inclined to interpret "scandalize " in the sense of sh ockin�
or horrifying others, and the substantive "scand al" comes to mear.
either the fact at which th ey are sho ck ed o r th e defamatory gossip b;
which they are infor me d of the shocking fact. The theol ogical truth ol
the matter g oes deeper than th at, and "to give scandal" means techni
cally to provide ano ther through one's own example with an inducement
or enticem ent to sin. Cl early, scandal is as m uch contrary t o fraternal
charity as is cooperatio n in another's sin. In fact, some theologian:,
might consider it m ore so; f or whereas they consider the cooperator as
one who assists anothe r, already intent on sin and h ence already a
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sinner, to carry out his dete rmined purpose, they see i� scandal a
.
.
decisive factor in bringing the will of another to its o ngmal
smful
decision. But in any event, scandal in its th eological s ense can be a
serious moral matte r.
This inducement to sin, wh ich is scandal, may h ave its_ e ffect in any
more of seve ral ways. W hat one says or does may, for example,
provide a direct t emptation for others, as might the risqu� story, which
may perhaps be a relatively h armless thing when told m a group o f
normal adults, but w hich could easily be a source of impure thoughts for
impressionable adolescents. Or one 's example may serve to p er�u�de
ano ther that so mething actually sinful is permissible ; or th at comm1ttmg
a sin is not such a te rrible thing after all; or that the alleged ideals of
our religion are mere sham and hypocrisy. and that therefore the faith
we profess is to be despised and shunned. Suppose a priest were to be
seen eating meat o n Friday in a public restaurant: w oul d not there be
danger that some Catholics, observing this ano maly, would b� tempted
.
to think less of the Church 's law of abstinence and to argue, 1f he can
do it, so can I"? And might not non-Cat holics, who are .commonly quite
aware of our Friday obligation, have reason to despise and ridicule the
hypocrisy of the priest who professes one thing and practices another.
and thus be furthe r alienated from Catholicism which h e represents?
Examples of scandal are almost wit hout number, but they all share in
.
common that element of presenting another with an inducement to sm.
one o r

I'

N ow it cannot be denied th at even the mo st innoc ent of human
actions will at times be subj ect to misinterpretation because of eithe r
ignorance or even ·sheer malice on the part of othe rs. T hus the priest, in
the example cited above, may be legitimately dispensed or excused from
the law of abstinence because of seriously poor health. Yet if those who
observe him eating meat on Friday do not advert to t hat possibility
(ignorance of sorts on their part). or stubbornly refuse to consider it as
.
a likely explanation of his acting as he does (malice), there still remams
the possibility of their being scandalized by an act which is obje�ti�ely
good and lawful. Must we therefore refrain from e ven perm1ss1ble
actions wheneve r we· fore see that scandal may be taken from them?
Common sense tells us that w e are not always so obliged, and moral
theology ratifies common sense by conceding that if we h ave good and
sufficient reason for our action, a reason proportionate to the harm
which may result in the form of unintended scandal, w e may legiti!11ately
_
act and permit the unintended evil effect. H ence the moralist s rule
governing unintended scandal represents still another application of the
principle of double e ffect, and re quires, togethe r with the other usual
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conditions, a reason in proportion to the evil which may result froi 1
one's innocent manner of acting.

which would require modification of that conclusion. Meanwhile, if I
may be permitted to apply to this question a bit of sound advice· which
Fr. John C. Ford, S.J., includes in his discussion of psychoanalysis, 3 I
would suggest that the best practical way to avoid the moral problem is
to choose a medical partner whose principles and practices are known
not to offend against Christian morality.

How is scandal, in the sense of enticement to sin, verified in th-�
situation under discussion? People commonly assume that declarec1
partners in medical practice are in substantial agreement as to bot
medical procedures and medical morals. When it becomes known ( an,
it would not long remain a secret) that one partner advocates an<
indulges in practices contrary to natural law, it will be presumed eithe
that the Catholic party is in sympathy with those immoral practices, o
at least that he condones them in his partner ( even while righteous!·
disclaiming· any part in them himself) and is sharing in the proceed
from them. Because of this seeming bad example on the part of one whr
represents himself as a Catholic - and remember that a doctor is :.·
person of prestige in any community and that his example is more tha1
ordinarily influential-it is not unlikely that some of the faithful migh ·
be induced to think lightly of birth-control, abortion, etc.; while non
Catholics, knowing well our professed stand on such practices, migh ·
find confirmation for their own erroneous convictions, and grounds fo,
ridiculing Catholicism for preaching one doctrine and condoning it!
contrary. "How is it that Dr. So-and-So can be associated in somethinc
the Church claims to be gravely sinful and yet be allowed to receive th;
Sacraments? Either the Church's doctrine is hypocrisy, or else we havE
been too credulous in believing that those practices are so very wrong."
_That in general could easily be common reaction to such a situation, and
that is serious public scandal.
And for the physician to say, "I am not responsible for the misin
terpretations which ignorant and suspicious people make of my innocen!
actions" would be to miss entirely the point regarding scandal. B
creating a situation which makes such an interpretation likely, and b y
doing so without a sufficiently grave reason, one makes himself respon
sible for contributing somewhat to the sin of others-something which,
as we have said, charity forbids if it can be reasonably avoided.
Hence to the original question, as supplemented by the several
assumptions which it seemed necessary to make, 1 would conclude that
meqical partnership of this nature would be morally reprehensible.
unless possibly because of an extraordinary and grave reason. So great
would be the expectancy of serious scandal, and so difficult to avoid all
manner of sinful cooperation and approbation, that I for one cannot
suggest a practical situation in which such a partnership might seem to
be permissible. Perhaps, however, conscientious physicians, who are
more aware than myself of medical realities, could cite circumstances
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THE MARIAN YEAR
YET this centenary ... of the solemn definition of the Immaculate Conception
... sho�ld not only serve to revive Catholic faith and earnest devotion to the Mother
of God in the souls of all, but Christians should also, in as far as possible, conform
their lives to the image of the same Virgin. Just as all mothers are deeply affected
when they perceive that the countenance of their children refle<;ts a peculiar likeness
,to their own, so also our Most Sweet Mother wishes for nothing more, never rejoices
more than when she sees those whom, under the cross of her Son, she has adopted as
children in His stead portray the lineaments and ornaments of her own soul in
thought, word, and deed.
But if this. devotion is not to consist of mere words, is not to be counterfeit coin
of religion or the weak and transitory affection of a moment, but is to be something
sincere, true and efficacious, it is necessary that each one of us should, according to
his co�dition ·of life, avail of it for the acquisition of virtue. The commemoration of
the mystery of the Most Holy Virgin, conceived immaculate and immune from all
stain of original sin, should, in the first place, urge us to that innocence and integrity
of life which flees from and abhors even the slightest stain of sin.
... Fu/gens Corona (The Radiant Crown)
encyclical letter of His Holiness,
Pope Pius XII on The Mc,rian Year

